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SUMMARY POWER OF THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS
BOARD TO SUSPEND PROPOSED AIRLINE RATES
The power of a federal regulatory agency to suspend a proposed
tariff change is an important power that regulated carriers and
utilities must always consider. The power to summarily suspend a
rate request serves as an indirect control on the conduct of busi-
nesses in regulated areas and as a direct control over all rate
changes before they can be effected. Section 1002(g) of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act' empowers the Civil Aeronautics Board to sus-
pend proposed tariffs filed by air carriers. The Board can exercise
this power either on the procedural or substantive grounds speci-
fied in the Act. To effect any economic changes, a carrier must file
its tariff alterations with the Board and receive the Board's ap-
proval; to avoid encountering difficulties leading to a suspension
or total rejection of a proposed tariff, it is essential for an airline
to comply with all procedural and substantive requirements.
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 1002(g), 49 U.S.C. § 1482(g) (1970) (in
part) :
Whenever any air carrier shall file with the Board a tariff stating a
new individual or joint (between air carriers) rate, fare or charge
for interstate or overseas air transportation or any classification,
rule, regulation, or practice affecting such rate, fare, or charge, or
the value of the service thereunder, the Board is empowered, upon
complaint or upon its own initiative, at once, and, if it so orders,
without answer or other formal pleading by the air carrier, but
upon reasonable notice, to enter upon a hearing concerning the
lawfulness of such rate, fare, or charge, or such classification, rule,
regulation, or practice; and pending such hearing and the decision
thereon, the Board, by filing with such tariff, and delivering to the
air carrier affected thereby, a statement in writing of its reasons for
such suspension, may suspend the operation of such tariff and defer
the use of such rate, fare, or charge, or such classification, rule,
regulation, or practice, for a period of ninety days, and, if the pro-
ceeding has not been concluded and a final order made within such
period, the Board may, from time to time, extend the period of sus-
pension, but not for a longer period in the aggregate than one hun-
dred and eighty days beyond the time when such tariff would other-
wise go into effect; and, after hearing, whether completed before
or after the rate, fare, charge, classification, rule, regulation, or prac-
tice goes into effect, the Board may make such order with reference
thereto as would be proper in a proceeding instituted after such
rate, fare, charge, classification, rule, regulation, or practice had be-
come effective. . ..
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I. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
Section 403 of the Act spells out the procedures that each air
carrier must follow when submitting a proposed tariff. ' All tariffs
must be filed with the CAB and kept open to public inspection.!
Each tariff must be filed at least thirty days in advance of its effec-
tive date.4 The Board is empowered to reject any tariff filed that
does not conform with these procedural requirements or with any
regulations enacted thereunder by the Board.! If a tariff is rejected,
it is void and of no effect.' Once, however, a tariff is properly filed
with the Board and no substantive objections are pending, it be-
comes both conclusive and exclusive regarding a carrier's economic
rights and may not be altered through reference to outside con-
tracts or agreements.
7
The procedures to be followed are not complicated and are
plainly set out in the Act. Thus, any airline need only satisfy the
criteria set out in section 403 to avoid suspension by the Board
on procedural grounds.
I1. SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS
In contrast to the simple procedural steps set out in the Federal
2 Federal Aviation Act of 1958 5 403(a), 49 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (1970) (in
part) :
Every air carrier and every foreign air carrier shall file with the
Board, and print, and keep open to public inspection, tariffs show-
ing all rates, fares, and charges for air transportation between points
served by it, and between points served by it and points served by
any other air carrier or foreign air carrier when through service
and through rates shall have been established, and showing to the
extent required by regulations of the Board, all classifications, rules,
regulations, practices, and services in connection with such air trans-
portation. Tariffs shall be filed, posted, and published in such form
and manner, and shall contain such information, as the Board shall
by regulation prescribe; and the Board is empowered to reject any
tariff so filed which is not consistent with this section and such regu-
lations. Any tariff so rejected shall be void ...
3 1d.
' 14 C.F.R. § 221.160 (1972), see also Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 403(c),
49 U.S.C. 1373(c) (1970). 14 C.F.R. § 221.190 provides for less than 30 days
notice in case of actual emergency. See also Federal Aviation Act of 1958
403(c), 49 U.S.C. § 1373(c) (1970).
14 C.F.R. § 221.3 (1972), see also Federal Aviation Act of 1958 5 403(a),
49 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (1970).
6 14 C.F.R. § 221.182 (1972), see also Federal Aviation Act of 1958 5 403(a),
49 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (1970).
7 Slick Airways, Inc. v. U.S., 292 F.2d 515 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
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Aviation Act are the substantive requirements that proposed tariffs
must meet to be acceptable to the CAB. According to the pro-
visions of section 404 of the Act a proposed tariff can not be:
A. Unjust or unreasonable8
B. Unjustly discriminatory'
C. Unduly preferential or prejudicial"°
Section 1002(d) of the Act also vests authority in the CAB to pro-
hibit the adoption of fares falling into these three closely related
classifications.1"
An objection may be filed opposing a proposed tariff if it is
8 Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 404(a), 49 U.S.C. S 1374(a) (1970):
It shall be the duty of every air carrier to provide and furnish inter-
state and overseas air transportation, as authorized by its certificate,
upon reasonable request therefore and to provide reasonable
through service in such air transportation in connection with other
air carriers; to provide safe and adequate service, equipment, and
facilities in connection with such transportation; to establish, ob-
serve, and enforce just and reasonable individual and joint rates,
fares, and charges, and just and reasonable classifications, rules,
regulations, and practices relating to such air transportation; and,
in case of such joint rates, fares, and charges, to establish just,
reasonable, and equitable divisions thereof as between air carriers
participating therein which shall not unduly prefer to prejudice
any of such participating air carriers.
9 Federal Aviation Act of 1958 5 404(b), 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1970):
No air carrier or foreign air carrier shall make, give, or cause any
undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular
person, port, locality, or description of traffic in air transportation
in any respect whatsoever or subject any particular person, port,
locality, or description of traffic in air transportation to any unjust
discrimination or any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disad-
vantage in any respect whatsoever.
10Id.
11 Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 1002(d), 49 U.S.C. § 1482(d) (1970) (in
part):
Whenever, after notice and hearing, upon complaint, or upon its
own initiative, the Board shall be of the opinion that any individual
or joint rate, fare, or charge demanded, charged, collected or re-
ceived by any air carrier for interstate or overseas air transportation,
or any classification, rule, regulation, or practice affecting such rate,
fare, or charge, or the value of the service thereunder, is or will
be unjust or unreasonable, or unjustly discriminatory, or unduly
preferential, or unduly prejudicial, the Board shall determine and
prescribe the lawful rate, fare, or charge (or the maximum or mini-
mum, or the maximum and minimum thereof) thereafter to be de-
manded, charged, collected or received, or the lawful classification,
rule, regulation, or practice thereafter to be made effective. . ..
See also National Airlines, Inc., DC-6 Daylight Coach Case, 14 C.A.B. 331, 336,
342-43 (1951); The Hawaiian Common Fares Case, 10 C.A.B. 921, 923-24
(1949).
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alleged that it will fall into one of these prohibited classes. As
opposed to a procedural objection that can only be raised by the
Board, a substantive objection may be filed by either the Board,
on its own motion, or by a third party having a sufficient interest."2
The Board may dismiss a complaint without a hearing when, in
its opinion, the complaint does not state facts that warrant an
investigation." This option not to act, however, is not un-
limited because once a complaining party has made a prima facie
showing that a fare is discriminatory, it is incumbent upon the
Board to show affirmatively the public policy reasons for not in-
vestigating the tariff, or that its inaction is justified in terms of
established CAB precedent or policy. 4 On the other hand, if the
Board determines that it will investigate the proposed fare, it has
discretionary power to either summarily suspend the rate" or to
allow it to be enacted pending determination of its validity."
Difficulty arises in implementing this summary power because
the statutory meanings of the three prohibited discriminatory cate-
gories of air fares' are vague in themselves and not clearly defined
in the Act. What factors may a Board consider in determining
whether a rate is "unjustly discriminatory?" What characterizes an
"unjust or unreasonable" rate? And finally, what does the term
"unduly preferential and prejudicial" mean?
Although these classifications are not explained in the Act, it
has been determined that in interpreting and applying these terms
"Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 1002(a), (d), 49 U.S.C. § 1482(a),
(d) (1970). Subsection (d) is quoted note 11 supra. Although third party ob-
jections are ordinarily filed by another airline that deems itself adversely af-
fected, the range of third parties having "sufficient interest" has been broadened
considerably by two federal court decisions in which bus companies were held
to have standing to question airline fares. Although mere competition with ground
transportation was rejected as a basis for standing, the court concluded that in-
sofar as an abuse would result in harm to the traveling public the bus companies
would be allowed to represent and vindicate the public right and public interest.
Trailways of New England, Inc. v. CAB, 412 F.2d 926 (1st Cir. 1969); Trans-
continental Bus System, Inc. v. CAB, 383 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 920 (1968).
"Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 1002(d), 49 U.S.C. § 1482(d) (1970),
quoted note 11 supra.
"4 Trailways of New England, Inc. v. CAB, 412 F.2d 926, 932 (lst Cir. 1969).
"Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 1002(g), 49 U.S.C. § 1482(g) (1970),
quoted note 1 supra.
"6 This was done in Transcontinental Bus System, Inc. v. CAB, 383 F.2d 466
(5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968).
'" See note 11 supra.
the public interest policy set out in section 102 and the rules of
ratemaking established in section 1002 must be considered. 8 Sec-
tion 102 of the Federal Aviation Act delineates the following
public interest considerations:
(i) encourage and develop air transportation,
(ii) recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of air trans-
portation,
(iii) promote adequate, economical, and efficient service at rea-
sonable rates and without unjust discrimination or undue
preference,
(iv) encourage competition necessary to assure sound develop-
ment of air transportation,
(v) promote air safety in commerce, and
(vi) promote, encourage, and develop civil aeronautics."
The Board, however, is only required to consider these six enumer-
ated standards "among other things" in the performance of its
powers and duties."0 The phrase "among other things" recorded in
the opening statement of section 102 has been interpreted by the
CAB to be a clear indication that Congress intended the enumer-
ated criteria only to specify "some" of the elements that are to be
considered.2 Therefore, since these enumerated considerations
merely give the Board direction and do little to limit its determi-
native power in respect to proposed tariffs, their value as an aid
in interpreting the three prohibitory categories is diminished.
There is yet another section of the Act that the Board is required
to consider in determining whether to accept or suspend proposed
rates. Section 1002(e) entitled "Rule of Ratemaking" provides the
Board with five additional factors to consider in determining the
validity of air fares:
(i) the effect of the rate upon the movement of traffic,
(ii) the need for adequate and efficient transportation by air
at the lowest cost consistent with such service,
(iii) the standards of service to be rendered,
"8 National Airlines, Inc., DC-6 Daylight Coach Case, 14 C.A.B. 331 (1951);
The Hawaiian Common Fares Case, 10 C.A.B. 921 (1949).
'9 Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 102, 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970).
'0 Acting in the public interest and in accordance with the public convenience
and necessity, Id.
" Air Passenger Tariff Discount Investigation, 3 C.A.B. 242 (1942).
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(iv) the inherent advantages of air transportation, and
(v) the need of each carrier for revenue sufficient to provide
adequate and efficient air service.2"
The Board has also determined that the elements enumerated in
section 1002(e) are to be considered among other factors in de-
ciding whether a rate is substantively acceptable." Accordingly,
the potential elements that the Board may consider in assessing
the substantive propriety of a proposed tariff appears to be ex-
panded rather than limited by the provisions of the Act.
In light of the broad authority vested in the Board to summarily
suspend rates on substantive grounds, it is essential for representa-
tives of air carriers to understand the method that the Board em-
ploys to determine whether a rate will fall in a prohibited classifi-
cation, and therefore be subject to suspension. Since there is little
clarification within the Aviation Act itself, it is necessary to look
outside the Act to understand the interpretations applied to these
vague categories.'
A. Unjust or Unreasonable
The power to determine the reasonableness of a rate found
in any carrier tariff on file with the Board is delegated to that
agency rather than the courts.' Therefore, past Board decisions
provide the basis for discerning what is an unjust or unreasonable
tariff.
Any carrier has two types of fares: (i) the basic fares, e.g., for
regular first class or coach service and (ii) promotional fares, i.e.
those geared at filling available seats that would otherwise remain
empty.
2 Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 1002(e), 49 U.S.C. § 1482(e) (1970).
2 3 National Airlines, Inc., DC-6 Daylight Coach Case, 14 C.A.B. 331 (1951);
The Hawaiian Common Fares Case, 10 C.A.B. 921 (1949). Both sections 102
and 1002 were first enacted in the original Civil Aviation Act of 1938, 52 Stat.
980 (1938).
24Sections 403 and 404 were also preserved from the original 1938 Act with
only minor changes in phrasing. Although there were major revisions to the 1938
Act in 1958, no material changes were made to either of these sections. See
H. R. Rep. No. 2360, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). Therefore, historical inter-
pretations of the Act's application specifically relating to these enumerated pro-
visions are valid to interpret them as they are recorded in the present Federal
Aviation Act of 1958.
25 Hycel Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 190, 192 (D.C. Tex.
1971); Tishman & Lipp, Inc. v. Delta Airlines, 275 F. Supp. 471, 475-76
(S.D.N.Y. 1967), afj'd, 413 F.2d 1401 (1969).
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Proposed fares for the former class-those available for the
basic types of services-must be capable of meeting the "fully
allocated" cost of service to be considered as reasonable. In other
words, the fares should meet the costs of operations, whether direct
or indirect, and allow for a return of profit.' Although rates for
all classes of traffic and service need not cover the entire cost of
carrying the traffic or providing the service, they must always be
reasonably related to cost." This reasonableness involves the con-
sideration of the: (i) recognition of variations in the ability of traffic
to carry a full share of costs of different stages in the development
of that specific traffic, (ii) effect of low rates in generating new
traffic and (iii) resulting effect of increased volume on reduction
in unit costs.28 A proposed rate must cover the present costs of a
service and promote a sound economic growth to be reasonable.
To sustain this financial growth, the rates will vary corresponding
to the stage of development of a particular service because they
must be adjusted to relate reasonably to an expected future level
of expenses for further development.' A different rate pattern
would be disruptive to both the industry and commerce by pro-
ducing wide variations in traffic volume thereby hampering the
orderly development of the industry. Also, if a particular rate were
uneconomically low, it would place an undue burden on other
types of transportation without compensatory benefit.'
Proposed fares for the latter class, promotional fares, must also
have some relationship to costs. The CAB determines the accept-
ability of these fares by applying the profit-impact test.2 ' Under the
profit-impact test, a fare not reasonably related to fully allocated
costs can still be found to be reasonable if it improves the net
profits of the carrier. To satisfy this test, a promotional fare must
generate sufficient traffic to offset the loss from self-diversion, i.e.
passengers traveling at the lower fare who would have traveled at
the normal fare, plus the increased cost of carrying the additional
2Summer Excursion Fares Case, 11 C.A.B. 218 (1950).
'7 Pittsburgh-Philadelphia No Reservation Fare Investigation, 34 C.A.B. 508




21 Family Fare Tariffs-Complaint of Transcontinental Bus Service, Inc.,
CAB Order No. E-26431 (Feb. 29, 1968).
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traffic. This test is predicated upon the assumption that additional
traffic attracted by the discounted fare will not require increased
capacity costs to handle the extra passengers; therefore, no ca-
pacity costs are allocated to the particular discount fare under
investigation. Conversely, the profit-impact test is not appropriate
for discount fare services that require the operation of additional
capacity."
Once the stimulation of the discounted or promotional fares has
resulted in enough new traffic to require expansion of the opera-
tions to accommodate it, unless the fare is then reasonably related
to the fully allocated costs of the service, it becomes unreason-
able.'
Applying the profit-impact test, the Board's determination of rea-
sonableness of a proposed promotional fare depends on their
determination of the generation-diversion ratio, i.e. does the addi-
tional traffic generated by the promotional fare offset the diversion
from full fare traffic? This finding will require an actual assess-
ment of the specific circumstances surrounding the proposed fares.
Regardless of the circumstances, however, the CAB demands that
the airline profit from its proposed tariff. A tariff that will not effect
a profit will ordinarily be held unreasonable.'
It is apparent that generally the Board's interpretation of "un-
just or unreasonable" fares is in terms of rate structure alone; that
is, a rate structure must be economically sound. If the Board
determines that a rate is unsound it will be deemed unjust or un-
reasonable and therefore not acceptable.
B. Unjustly Discriminatory
The Act prohibits any tariff that is unjustly discriminatory.'
Discrimination can exist in two forms: (i) charging different rates
to different passengers who are afforded the same or like service '
32 Domestic Passenger-Fare Investigation, Phase 5-Discount Fares, Docket
21866-5 (Dec. 5, 1972).
" Trans World Airlines, Inc., Rates for Phonograph Records, CAB Order
No. E-22935 (Nov. 26, 1965).
'Family Fare Tariffs-Complaint of Transcontinental Bus Service, Inc.,
CAB Order No. E-26431 (Feb. 29, 1963).
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 404(b), 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1970),
quoted note 9 supra.
36 ICC v. Alabama M. Ry., 168 U.S. 144, 166 (1897); Wight v. United States,
167 U.S. 512, 517 (1897); Certified Air Carrier Military-Tender Investigation,
or (ii) offering special services only to a select group of patrons.'
Either type of discriminatory tariff is justified only when the regu-
lar fare and reduced-rate service are produced by dissimilar cir-
cumstances and conditions." The Federal Aviation Act provides
that the weight of the evidence in each particular case is a matter
for the Board to decide," but the determination of what factors
are to be weighed is a question of statutory interpretation that can
be considered by the courts as well as by the Board.' The Board
has ruled that effects on transportation competition," contributions
to national defense," discounted rates reducing expenses, ' and, to
some extent, considerations of public policy' are factors that may
properly be invoked as a defense for a fare alleged to be unjustly
discriminatory. Increased revenue' and promotional aspectse have
28 C.A.B. 902, 924 (1959); Summer Excursion Fares Case, 11 C.A.B. 218, 222-23
(1950).
" Historically, unjust discrimination arose only when carriers charged different
rates for like services. The charging of different rates for unlike service fell under
the undue preference prohibition of the Interstate Commerce Act § 3(1), 49
U.S.C. § 3(1) (1970), and has since been extended to the unjust discrimination
prohibition of the Federal Aviation Act, § 404(b). Transcontinental Bus Service,
Inc. v. CAB, 383 F.2d 466, 485 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920
(1968).
11 ICC v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 145 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1892); Certified Air
Carrier Military-Tender Investigation, 28 C.A.B. 902, 924 (1959); Summer Ex-
cursion Fares, 11 C.A.B. 218, 222-23 (1950).
39Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 1006(e), 49 U.S.C. § 1486(e) (1970).
'°See ICC v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 372 U.S. 744 (1963); Delta Air-
lines, Inc. v. Summerfield, 347 U.S. 74 (1954); Administrative Procedure Act S
10(e), 5 U.S.C. 5 1009(e) (1970).
"' American Airlines, Military Fares, 38 C.A.B. 1038, 1039 (1963); Certified
Air Carrier Military-Tender Investigation, 28 C.A.B. 902, 905-12 (1959).
4 American Airlines, Military Fares, 38 C.A.B. 1038, 1039 (1963) (morale
factor considered in permitting rapid transportation to be available to servicemen
on leave at a discounted price within their means).
41 Certified Air Carrier Military-Tender Investigation, 28 C.A.B. 902, 910-11
(1959); Capital Group Student Fares, 26 C.A.B. 451, 454 (1958); Group Excur-
sion Fares Investigation, 25 C.A.B. 41, 46-47 (1957). The reduced cost justifica-
tion is only applicable to that type of discrimination that allows unlike service to
be extended to a special group because it would be impossible to perform the
same or like service and have substantial cost differentials.
4Group Excursion Fares Investigation, 25 C.A.B. 41, 47 (1957) (a fare differ-
ential for group travel may be provided under certain conditions without being
unjustly discriminatory).
"Group Excursion Fares Investigation, 25 C.A.B. 41, 46 (1957); Tour Busing
Fares, 14 C.A.B. 257, 258 (1951); The Hawaiian Common Fares Case, 10 C.A.B.
921, 925-26 (1949).
4Frontier Airlines, Reduced Fares for Teachers, 38 C.A.B. 1148, 1149
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been held not to be elements justifying a discriminatory fare.
Any consideration of fares or rates applicable to a special class
of persons must commence with the proposition that:
the rule of equality is the very core and essence of the fare struc-
ture in the transportation industry, and it should not be rendered
a meaningless phrase by the use of spurious justifications for un-
justly discriminatory rates."7
Therefore, "equality of treatment is paramount"; any factors
alleged to justify departure from the rule of equality must be
weighed in the light of that pervasive requirement." Moreover,
as stated earlier, the range of factors that the Board may consider
in justification of a discriminatory fare is circumscribed. According
to the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals, the justification of any dis-
crimination is "limited to those factors which Congress has by
statute deemed material, and those factors which regulatory prac-
tice in the transportation industry has, through experience, found
relevant." 9 Therefore, factors related to the status of the traffic but
not to transportation and matters involving broad social policies,
e.g., special treatment for any particular age group, may not be
considered in justification of a discriminatory fare.
The rule under section 404(b) prohibiting unjust discrimination
is not absolute and is not a term easily adapted to rigid applica-
tion. Rather it is a rule of reason that must be applied to specific
circumstances as they are raised before the Board. 1 As noted
earlier, the Act itself does not define this prohibited element;
therefore, the Board has utilized outside sources to interpret this
provision. The CAB has looked for guidance to the Interstate
Commerce Act"2 (ICA) which provides that a rate is unjustly dis-
(1963); Group Excursion Fares Investigation, 25 C.A.B. 41, 46 (1957); Investi-
gation of Full Adult Fares for Unaccompanied Children, 24 C.A.B. 408, 413
(1956); The Hawaiian Common Fares Case, 10 C.A.B. 921, 925-26 (1949).
" Transcontinental Bus Service, Inc. v. CAB, 383 F.2d 466, 485 (5th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968).
48 Id.
41 Id. at 484.
0 Domestic Passenger-Fare Investigation, Phase 5-Discount Fares, Docket
21866-5 (Dec. 5, 1972).
11 Texas & Pacific R.R. Co. v. ICC, 162 U.S. 197 (1896); Transcontinental
Bus System, Inc. v. CAB, 383 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
920 (1968).
5249 U.S.C. § 102 (1970).
NOTES
criminatory if it grants different treatment to like traffic for like
and contemporaneous services offered under substantially the same
or similar circumstances or conditions.' The desired results of
implementing the ICA was to create equality:
The great purpose of the Act to regulate commerce . . . was to
secure equality of rates as to all, and to destroy favoritism . . .
by prohibiting . . . for hidden rebates, preferences and all other
forms of undue discrimination. 4
The CAB strives for this same equality in its application of the
Federal Aviation Act.
It appears therefore that the prohibited "unjust discrimination"
potential of a proposed air fare refers to a discrimination related
to the type of service rather than to the rate itself.5 This discrimi-
nation refers to a differential of treatment of certain persons pay-
ing the same fare or to a differential in rate charged to certain
persons paying for the same services. If the CAB determines that
a proposed fare falls under this class, it is empowered to reject it.
C. Unduly Preferential or Prejudicial
It is well established that when legislation has been interpreted
by administrative agencies charged with the duty of administering
it and by courts reviewing the action of these administrative
agencies, the interpretations will be presumed to control with re-
spect to similar and subsequent legislation on the same subject
matter.' Section 404(b) of the Federal Aviation Act is fashioned
after sections 2,3(1), and 216(d) of the ICA.' In administering
3 Wight v. U.S., 167 U.S. 512 (1897); Transcontinental Bus System, Inc. v.
CAB, 383 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968).
"New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co. v. ICC, 200 U.S. 361, 391-92
(1906).
"5 The term "unjust or unreasonable" has been interpreted to refer to discrimi-
nation related directly to the rate itself. See text at notes 25 to 34, supra.
-" Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
.7 49 U.S.C. § 2 (1970): That if any common carrier subject to the provisions
of this shall, directly or indirectly, * * * receive from any person or persons a
greater or less compensation for any service rendered, or to be rendered, in the
transportation of passengers or property, subject to the provisions of this part,
than it * * * receives from any other person or persons for doing for him or
them a like and contemporaneous service in the transportation of a like kind of
traffic under substantially similar circumstances and conditions, such common
carrier shall be deemed guilty of unjust discrimnation, which is hereby prohibited
and declared to be unlawful.
49 U.S.C. § 3(1) (1970): It shall be unlawful for any common carrier sub-
1973]
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section 216(d), the Interstate Commerce Commission has repeat-
edly held that it must accord great weight to the precedents estab-
lished by the courts and by itself under sections 2 and 3 (1) of
the ICA. 8 The question whether rates or fares for different, related
services or for similar service between different points are lawful
is governed by section 3 (1) of the ICA relating to "undue or un-
reasonable preference or prejudice." This same language is used in
section 404(b) of the Aviation Act. A typical example of undue
preference or prejudice is the practice of "common faring", i.e.
the practice of charging the same fare to two points that are dif-
ferent distances from the point of origin."9
In section 404(b) of the Aviation Act, the phrases "preference
or advantage" and "prejudice or disadvantage" are preceded by
the words "undue or unreasonable '"' just as it appears in section
216(d) of the ICA." In interpreting the limitation "undue or un-
reasonable" of the ICA, it has been established that "the mere
circumstance that there is, in a given case, a preference or an ad-
vantage, does not of itself show that such preference or advantage
is undue or unreasonable ... ."" Rather, all reasonable "circum-
ject to the provisions of this part to make, give, or cause any undue or unreason-
able preference or advantage to any particular person, * * * locality, port, * * *
or any particular description of traffic, in any respect whatsoever; or to subject
any particular person, * * * locality, port, * * * or any particular description
of traffic to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect
whatsoever: Provided, however, That this paragraph shall not be construed to
apply to discrimination, prejudice, or disadvantage to the traffic of any other car-
rier of whatever description.
49 U.S.C. § 216(d) (1970): * * * It shall be unlawful for any common
carrier by motor vehicle engaged in interstate or foreign commerce to make,
give, or cause any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particu-
lar person, port, * * * locality, * * * or description of traffic, in any respect
whatsoever; or to subject any particular person, port, * * * locality, * * * or
description of traffic to any unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasonable
prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever * * *
-8 Arrangements-Arrow Carrier Corp. and Duplan Silk Corp., 4 M.C.C. 657,
677 (1938); Chicago and Wisconsin Points Proportional Rates, 17 M.C.C. 573,
578 (1939); Consolidation Rule on Shipments at Seattle and Spokane, 22 M.C.C.
295, 299 (1940).
19 Hilo Mainland Temporary Service Investigation, CAB Order No. E-25252
(June 6, 1967); Northern Consolidated Airlines, Inc., Proposed Fares, 33 C.A.B.
440 (1961); The Hawaiian Common Fares Case, 10 C.A.B. 921 (1949).
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 404(b), 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1970),
quoted note 9 supra.
" Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 216(d) (1970) quoted note 57 supra.
" Texas & Pac. Railway v. ICC, 162 U.S. 197 (1896).
stances and conditions" are to be considered in determining
whether a proposed rate is unduly prejudicial or preferential."
What the term "circumstances and conditions" denotes has not
been specifically determined; it is a factual matter to be decided
in each instance upon the evidence of record. In 1924 the Supreme
Court recognized certain factors to be considered when it stated
that "the difference in rates can not be held illegal unless it is
shown that it is not justified by the cost of the respective services,
by their values, or by other transportation conditions."" Earlier,
in the Alabama Midland Railway' case of 1897, the Supreme
Court indicated that competition was another factor to consider.
Therefore, it appears that costs, competition and other factors inci-
dental to the fixing of rates are proper elements to consider in de-
termining whether proposed fares will result in an undue or un-
reasonable preference or prejudice prohibited by the Act.
The greatest area of difficulty arises in distinguishing between
the "discriminatory" rate and the rate that falls under the classifi-
cation of "preferential or prejudicial." A specific example is the
most appropriate means to clarify the difference between these two
distinct classifications. It has been determined that if, under a
proposed tariff, all passengers were to pay the same fare to arrive
at their destinations, although some destinations were at a nearer
point on the route than others, there would be no issue of "unjust
discrimination" under the Act since a difference in fares paid for like
and contemporaneous transportation between the same points would
be essential to raise that question. The issue of preference and
prejudice, however, would be present because requiring a passenger
traveling along the same route to a nearer point to pay the same
fare as one going to a further point prejudices the former who is
required to assume a greater proportion of the applicable costs, and
prefers the latter who carries a relatively smaller proportion of such
costs." Another point of characteristic differentiation is the pro-
cedural element unique to a complaint based on the prejudicial
or preferential aspect that injury to the passenger may be inferred
6 Id. at 219.
SUnited States v. Illinois Central R.R., 263 U.S. 515 (1924).
ICC v. Alabama Midland Ry., 168 U.S. 144 (1897).
"The Hawaiian Common Fares Case, 10 C.A.B. 921 (1949).
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from the mere fact that he pays as great a fare as the next pas-
senger, but receives less transportation services.'
Therefore, this category of prohibited fares can be distinguished
from the other two by emphasizing that "undue preference or
prejudice" does not refer to a discrimination per se, but only to a
discrimination based on distance or location. This class includes
those fares that fail to charge distinct amounts based upon the
distance and destination of a passenger.
III. CONCLUSION
The power of the CAB to suspend rates is statutorily limited to
the three instances discussed above. Regardless of how extensively
one investigates the matter, however, it is difficult to predict
which proposed rates will be rejected by the Board as included in
one of the prohibited categories. The Board has recognized 8 that
the terms used in the statute-that charges must be reasonable,
that any discrimination that may be present can not be unjust, and
that any advantage to a particular person or locality can not be
undue-are extremely vague making it impossible for strict uni-
formity to be enforced. It has been determined that the CAB, given
the power to enforce the economic regulations of the Federal Avia-
tion Act, must consider the circumstances as they arise and apply
the unpredictable reasonable man test to decide the fate of a pro-
posed rate." Therefore, as indicated by the Board itself, past hold-
ings and decisions can be used as a guide for air carriers to follow
in establishing their proposed tariffs, but not as an unequivocal
rule.
Elliott S. Garsek
"Mitchell v. U.S., 313 U.S. 80 (1941); ICC v. U.S., ex rel. Campbell, 289
U.S. 385 (1933).
"s Air Passenger Tariff Discount Investigation, 3 C.A.B. 242 (1942).
"Texas & Pac. Railway v. ICC, 162 U.S. 197, 219 (1896).
